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”A Possible Solution to the Problem Presented 
by Missing Owners of Fee Simple Title or Non-Consenting 
Owners with a Coal or Lignite Prospect”
The size of our estimated recoverable reserves1 and the
present potential for development portend that the oft pre-
2
dicted accelerated expansion of coal production, compelled 
by the gravity of the energy crisis, is now inevitable. Coal 
conversion, i.e., the switch by electric utilities or other 
major fuel burning installations from oil or natural gas to 
coal as a primary fuel source, as mandated by the Powerplant and 
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978,3 will provide the primary im-
4
petus that will make the opening of new mines a likely prospect. 
The prospective development of coal reserves entails the problems 
inherent in acquiring the rights necessary to conduct mining 
operations. Difficulties in determining the mineral ownership, 
locating the mineral owner and procuring the mining lease have 
long plagued mineral development, particularly for oil and gas. 
However, the magnitude of the coal reserves that may be required 
to be aggregated to establish a feasible mining unit, and more 
importantly, the nature of the mining process likely to be con-
templated exacerbates the problems inherent in acquiring such
6
rights and may constitute barriers to the opening of new mines 
and, additionally, preclude the efficient and optimum develop-
ment of a vitally needed energy source.7
The large scale aggregation of reserves is required for 
the opening of new mines by the dictates of coal conversion,8
the predominant market for expanded production. A utility is
naturally reluctant to risk the capital required to erect a new
coal fired plant or to convert existing plants to coal without a
firm supply of reserves dedicated to the life of the plant. To
successfully market coal to such a project, the mining operator
must have sufficient committed reserves or at least demonstrate
the ability to acquire such reserves, to fuel the plant for ap-
9
proximately 30 years. Projections as to the amount of coal
required to fuel a moderate size coal fired plant for that period
of time range from 790 million tons for bituminuous, a high BTU
10
coal, to 1.5 billion tons for low BTU lignite.
Surface mining, where technologically feasible, will in all 
probability be the mining process utilized in any coal develop-
ment project. In the coal mining industry, surface mined coal 
production currently exceeds the output of deep mined coal,11
despite the fact that total strippable coal reserves comprise
12
only twelve percent of total recoverable coal reserves. The 
predominance of surface mining in the development of coal re-
serves is attributed to its being more economical than deep
mining,13 as it is less labor intensive,14 inherently safer15
16 
and yields a greater ultimate recovery of coal reserves. Sur-
face mine projects may also be more quickly developed than deep 
mines.17 Furthermore, coal deposits located in close proximity 
to the surface may only be developed by surface mining.
Surface mining involves the tearing away of the earth's 
surface and the horizontal extraction of the minerals. Contour 
mining, utilized in mountainous areas, involves the excavation of 
a portion of the hill side to expose the seam and permit the
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removal of the coal. A "highwall", a vertical bank which marks 
the limit of the excavation, and a "bench", which is the rela-
18
tively flat area remaining after the coal is removed, results.
19
"Area" strip mining, applied to relatively flat topography 
characteristic of the coal fields located west of the Mississippi, 
entails the following sequence of events: stripping of the top 
soil by scrapers; removing the remaining overburden by a drag line; 
and, extracting the coal from the seam by drilling or blasting. 
Reclamation, the rehabilitation of the surface mined land in accord-
ance with the environmental performance standards mandated by the 
applicable state reclamation act or, in absence thereof, by the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 197720 (SMCRA) , is 
integrated into and occurs simultaneously with the mining process 
employed. The equipment, depending upon the size of the mining
unit, typically involves high power shovels and drag lines that
21
frequently are the largest land moving machines in the world.
After processing, the coal has to be transported from the 
mine to the coal fired plant which may be located vast distances 
away. To eliminate the high costs and other problems inherent in 
the long distance transportation of coal, on-site utilization 
has occurred or is planned, particularly with respect to low BTU 
coal situated in the Southwest, in which a "mine mouth" coal 
fired plant is erected near the mine site, with the generating 
facilities clustered nearby to transmit the electricity by power 
lines to the distant market.
Obviously, during the mining and reclaiming process the 
surface of the land is radically disturbed and its beneficial 
use is thereby forclosed for an extended period of time. The
- 3 -
mine operator may also deem it practical to occupy all of the 
land within the confines of the mining unit for plant and equip-
ment storage and utilization throughout the life of the project.22 
Additionally, although exceptions to the contrary have been ob-
served, the expectation is that the market and utility value of
23
the land will be lower after reclamation.
The amount of land necessary for inclusion in the mining 
unit to accumulate a sufficient amount of committed reserves and 
the complications inherent in surface mining increase the likeli-
hood that some landowners will "hold out” , i.e., refuse to grant 
the necessary rights to the mine operator. The purpose of this 
article is to examine the problem of "hold out"24 acreage and to 
speculate on how its obvious solution, legislation requiring the 
forced sale of the non-committed interest, should be structured
in order to be equitable and, as well, to encourage the most
25
efficient and optimum development of coal reserves.
An examination of the "hold out" acreage phenomena and its 
potential legislative solution necessitates an analysis of the 
fallowing relevant subjects: the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977; the mining rights incident to the sur-
face mining of coal; the current practices in the industry of 
acquiring such rights; and, finally, the structure and function 
of the proposed statutory scheme, including compensatory measures.
The Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act of 1977
26
The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 
(hereinafter referred to as SMCRA) , a product of a long and tur-
- 4 *
bulent congressional effort, is central to any compulsory min-
ing right acquisition scheme which contemplates surface mining as 
the process for coal extraction. The applicable reclamation re-
quirements, particularly the environmental performance standards 
which largely determines the consequence of surface mining to 
the physical condition of the land, are relevant to the nature 
of the property interest that the mining operator will have to 
acquire as well as to the compensation to be paid. Additionally, 
when the "hold out" acreage is surrounded by or adjacent to re-
serves included within the mining unit, the ability to satisfy 
the "offsite" environmental performance standards required to 
surface mine the committed acreage will bear on the necessity of 
the proposed statute.
Historically, surface mining has been distinguished by 
severe environmental disturbances occasioned by inadequate or 
non-existent reclamation attempts stemming from an absence of 
effective regulatory legislation.28 Strip mining without ade-
quate reclamation disrupted vast areas of surface land, wild-
29
life habitat and hydrological systems, The landscape was
scarred by deep depressions and ugly spoil banks of overburden 
incapable of supporting animal or plant life. The instability 
of the soil after stripping resulted in erosion and landslides. 
Phosphates, pyrites or other highly mineralized or toxic mater-
ials drained from the mine site and polluted streams and lakes. 
Blasting disrupted underground water formations and toxic or 
acid water from the affected mine site leached into the under-
ground water table and contaminated ground water supplies. The 
displacement of water in streams and lakes by silt and the ac-
27
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celerated rate or drainage from the bared stripped site result-
ed in widespread flooding. The damage resulting from erosion, 
landslides, flooding and water pollution as an incident of in-
sufficient regulation of surface mining was not restricted to the 
mine site but effected off-site areas, frequently encompassing
broad geographic zones, and yielded property damage, and oc-
30
casionally, personal injury, to private individuals, as well
as severe disturbances of the environment.
Besides the grotesque disfiguration of the landscape, the
cumulative harm to the environment, and the visitation of the
evils of spoiled wells, polluted water and flooding of adjacent
property owners; inadequately restored lands frequently were
totally unproductive and failed thereafter to make any beneficial
31
contribution to the local economy. The owners, generally the 
mine operator, abandoned the property. The assessed valuation 
for ad valorem tax purposes was at most, de minimis, and the 
tax base of the local community declined. Strip mining with-
out adequate reclamation over a broad geographic area seriously
33
impacted on local economies and created pockets of poverty.
Congress, in passing the SMCRA, recognizing that, increased 
surfaced mined coal production is inevitable if coal production 
expands to meet the nations energy needs, intended to minimize 
the attendant adverse environmental effects by making reclama- 
tion a prerequisite to the surface mining of coal. In effect, 
surface mining was only to be a temporary and not a terminal 
land use.35 Basically, this goal was to be achieved by estab-
lishing a regulatory process in which antecedent to the actual 
surface mining, the mine operator's reclamation plan, conform-
- 6 -
ing Co Che basic environmental performance standards promulgated
in Che Act, is determined by Che regulatory agency Co be adequate,
feasible and capable of implementation Co ensure Che prospective
use and productivity of Che effected land.36 Thereafter, rigorous
application of effective enforcement provisions was Co ensure that
37
the reclamation scheme is effectuated as approved.
The fundamental theory of the Act is that surface mining is 
Co be prohibited unless, with the burden of proof being placed 
on the mine operator, the attendant detrimental environmental 
effects, both on-site and off-site, can be avoided. Also, by 
merging the process of reclamation into the formative stage of 
Che mining project, the Act further enhanced the opportunity 
Co achieve effective reclamation. Surface mining and recla-
mation are integrated: no longer is stripping the paramount con-
cern of the mining operator with reclamation merely being an
38
"after thought" that is hastily conceived and poorly executed.
The increased emphasis on land restoration should result in 
greater success in reclamation projects. Additionally, as ade-
quate reclamation is expensive in that it requires methodical 
and definitive planning and detailed construction efforts, the 
Act externalizes that cost into the price of coal.
The SMCRA entails a complex statutory scheme which estab-
lishes a federal administrative agency, the Office of Surface
39
Mining and Reclamation Enforcement (OSMRE) to administer 
statutorily delineated environmental performance criteria and 
stringent enforcement procedures to attain the legislatively 
mandated standard of reclamation. A federalist approach is also 
incorporated in that a state may adopt its own statutory scheme,
- 7-
with appropriate enforcement procedures, so long as the environ-
mental performance standards and enforcement provisions, as de-
termined by the OSMRE, either equal to or exceed in their rigor-
ousness the "minimum" standards contained in the Act.40 Absent 
such state action, the SMCRA is applicable. During the period 
in which the states are promulgating their statutory scheme or 
awaiting federal approval, interim regulations have been pro-
mulgated and enforced by the OSMRE.41 Due to the prolixity of 
the federal regulations and the fact that most state programs 
have not been approved by the OSMRE, merely the federal act 
will be analyzed. 42
The statutory framework simply requires the mining opera-
43
tor to obtain a permit from the appropriate agency, either 
the federal OSMRE or the state agency administering the approved 
state program, in order to undertake a strip mining project.
As a prerequisite to being granted, the application for the per-
mit must describe the proposed mining and reclamation plan in 
sufficient detail to affirmatively demonstrate that the recla-
mation plan can be accomplished.44 The plan must also demon-
strate, and the agency must find in writing, that certain sta-
tutory prescribed minimum environmental performance standards 
will be satisfied before the permit may be granted.45 Addi-
tionally, the application permit must describe in detail: the
46  
hydrology of the area; the probable consequences of the mining
and reclamation on both the on-site and off-site hydrological 
49
balance and the agency must find, in writing, that the scheme 
has been designed to prevent material hydrological damage to 
the off-site area.48
The. permit, if issued, operates as follows: initially has
a duration of five y e a r s  will terminate for failure of the
operator to timely commence surface mining operations:50 may be
renewed beyond the five year period with respect to areas within
the boundaries of the plan;51 and, will terminate if the terms
52
and conditions of the approved plan are not being satisifed.
Reclamation, as contemplated by the approved plan, is en- 
sured by the requirement that a performance bond be submitted, 
prior to issuance of the permit, sufficient to pay a third party 
to perforin all of the reclamation work in the event of for- 
feiture. Additionally, continuous supervision of the imple-
mented reclamation project to ensure compliance with the permit
54
conditions is provided by on-site mine inspections, along with
the submission of monthly reports containing55 in depth data on
the progress of the project by the mining operator.
Civil penalties of $5,000 fines per day may be assessed
56
for violations of any permit conditions. Criminal penalties,
$10,000 per day fine or imprisonment of not more than one year
or both,57 is provided for willful and knowing violation of a
permit condition or the making of a known false representation
58
in a permit application.
The environmental performance standards establish the
minimum criteria for reclamation. The central requirement is
that the land must be restored to its capability of supporting
its pre-mining use or environmentally acceptable higher or
better uses that are not impractical, unlawful or inconsistent
with applicable land use policies or involve unreasonable delay 
   59
in implementation. As to prime agricultural lands, those
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designated by the Department of Agriculture as high yield crop
producers, the operator must demonstrate that the post mining
productivity of the restored farm lands will sustain the pre-
60
mining high yields. The "pre-mining or higher or better use" 
requirement ensures that the mined land will be returned to at 
least its pre-mining form of productivity and obviates the op-
portunity for convenience or economic attractiveness of a po-
tential restoration scheme, such as the creation of a series 
of artificial lakes, to dictate the reclamation effort and the 
subsequent post mining land use.
61
The affected area, with some exceptions, must be restor-
62
ed to its "approximate original contour" which requires the 
elimination of highwalls, spoil piles and depressions by back- 
filling, grading and, if necessary, compacting so that the land 
after restoration will resemble its pre-mining general surface
configuration and will blend into and complement the drainage
 63    
pattern of the surrounding terrain. The approximate original
contour requirement, although it clearly does not impose the
impossible task of achieving full restoration of the original
topography, has been criticized as precluding surface mining
or steep slopes in mountainous terrain characteristic of
Appalachia.64
A permanent vegetative cover consisting of diverse native
species, introduced species may be used under some circumstances,
capable of self-generation must also be established co-extensive
65
with the natural vegetative cover of the mined area. The 
re-established vegetation must support the utility of the post 
mining land use plan as well as stabilize the surface soil in
- 10-
order to prevent erosion and siltation. To assist the reveg- 
atation effort, the top soil, which must be restored, has to be 
removed in a separate layer, segregated from the toxic material 
to avoid contamination during the stripping process. The 
mine operator is responsible for the survival of the re-estab-
lished vegetation for a period of five years, or ten years in
arid or semi-arid conditions, after the last augmented vegeta-
68
tive effort, such as re-seeding or fertilizing occurs.
Additionally, the mine operator must also minimize the
69
consequences of surface mining to the hydrological balance and 
the quality of surface and ground water systems by using the best 
technology available to avoid acid or other toxic mine drainage
or pollution;70 prevent sedimentation and siltation or surface
71 72
waters; and, restore the recharge capacity of the acquifer.
The anticipated post mining condition of the land depends 
to a large extent on the post mining land use plan which is 
determined by the topography, dimensions of the coal seam and 
overburden, soil type, precipitation, and other physical or en-
vironmental land characteristics which effect the mining and 
reclamation plan. However, at least prior to the implementation 
of the SMCRA, examples of a higher or better land use resulting 
from surface mined reclamation typically involved mountainous 
terrain with a casual agricultural or grazing pre-mining land 
use, which could only feasibly and economically be restored by 
leveling the mined area, and, the market value increased due to 
the lack of level land in the area. However, economic effi-
ciency, consistent with engineering feasibility, will probably 
dictate that reclamation is unlikely to result in restoration
- 11 -
co an enhanced land use that improves the utility or value of 
the land.
The evidence is conflicting as to whether reclamation of 
surface mined land, in accordance with the minimum environmental 
performance standards, to a condition supporting its pre-mining 
use, typically agricultural or grazing activities, inevitably 
results in land which is physically inferior, due either to 
dimunition in utility or market value, to its pre-mining con-
dition. Evidence that reclaimed lands equal, or even exceed,
74
their pre-mining utility or productivity has been presented. 
Critics of the industry and some landowners provide evidence 
of diminished crop yields, ad valorem assessments and market 
values.75 Some fear exists that the detrimental effects of re-
moving and replacing the overburden will not be known for years
76
after the conclusion of the reclamation process.
The Right to Surface Mine
Although less exacting state reclamation statutes, repre-
senting varying degrees of stringency as to land rehabilitation 
requirements and enforcement efforts, have been in existence long 
before the SMCRA, the legal struggle between the mine opera-
tor and the landowner, in particular the severed surface estate 
owner, has not focused on the performance of reclamation or the 
functioning of such acts. The primary conflict has traditionally 
centered on whether the rights expressed or implied in the mining 
grant were sufficient to allow the mine. operator to extract 
the mineral by methods, usually necessary to either fully exhaust
- 12-
or economically mine the property, which substantially inter- 
fered with or adversely effected the surface estate. Initially, 
when deep mining was the primary method of mining coal, the issue 
was whether the mine operator was compelled to provide sub- 
jacent78 support by leaving adequate pillars of coal which may 
have represented up to forty percent of the deposit79 to avoid 
subsidence and its attendant damage to the surface estate.
The development of surface mining as the predominant and 
most attractive method of producing coal injected a new dimen- 
sion to the conflict existing between the surface estate, and the 
severed mineral estate as to the extent of the burden imposed
80
upon the former by the latter's right to exploit the mineral.
The paramount issue is whether the owner of the mineral estate 
has by implication, either implied in the instrument of sever-
ance or at law, the right to extract the mineral by surface 
mining with its attendant disruption and consequent harm to the 
surface estate. Case law resolving the issue has yielded the 
two distinct positions.
The majority view, which is followed by most of the tra-
ditional coal producing states, holds that the surface estate is 
entitled to be preserved in its natural condition undisturbed by
surface mining,81 even if the mineral owner is thereby precluded
82
from extracting the mineral. The implied development easement,
i.e., the right of reasonable and necessary use of the surface
to explore for and extract the mineral implied in the grant to
secure to the mineral owner the ability to mine the substance
and, thus, to beneficially enjoy the acquired interest does not
83
include a right to surface mine.
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The traditionally accepted basis for this right, inherent
in the surface estate, of surface preservation as originating in
84 85
Harris v. Ryding and Humphries v . Brogden, is the mineral
86
owner's duty to provide subjacent support to the surface estate.
The right to subjacent support as a basis for denying an implied
right to strip mine has been explained as follows: "... if....
the owner has a right to subjacent support . . . , (then) . . .
he has at least an equal right to hold entact the thing to be
87
supported, i.e., the surface . . . "  However, the failure to 
imply such a right is based on reasoning identical to that un-
derlying the common law imposition of the obligation to the 
mineral estate to provide subjacent support: the creation of the 
surface estate, by the instrument of severance, with its conse-
quent right of beneficial use and enjoyment evidences an intention, 
in absence of express language to the contrary, that it is not
to be destroyed in the process of the legitimate use of the min-
 88 
eral estate.
Therefore, in states adhering to the majority view, the
right to surface mine must have been expressly included within
the grant if such right is imparted to the mineral owner by the
instrument of severance. Almost, universally, the inquiry is
whether, according to the construction of the conveyance, the
parties contemplated surface mining - the removal of the over-
burden to extract the coal. Kentucky alone resolves the issue
by determining whether the parties contemplated, as opposed to
a particular method of mining, that the mineral owners rights to
surface usage in extracting the mineral would be superior to any
90
competing rights of the surface owner.
- 14-
Thus, the right to surface nine as ah incident of the own-
ership of the mineral estate is governed by the intent of the 
parties to the instrument of severance. The intent is ascer-
tained by construing the instrument as of the date of its exe- 
cution and considering the attendant surrounding circumstances.
A waiver of subjacent support is a prerequisite to the existence 
of such a right, but is not conclusive of the issue.92 The party
asserting the right to surface mine has the burden of proof.
Some differences in the methods utilized to ascertain the 
existence of the requisite intent exists. If the instrument does 
not expressly prohibit or permit surface mining,94 some courts 
construe the written language, with emphasis on the express de-
velopment easement, and, in addition, as part of the surrounding 
circumstances, look to the "common mining” practices, i.e., the 
methods of mining then practiced in the geographic area.95 Some 
courts further require that the language evidencing the right to 
surface mine be clear and convincing; especially if the common 
mining practices did not then include surface mining. Other 
jurisdictions have expanded the evidence of contemporaneous cir-
cumstances to encompass not only the common mining practices, but 
to include the "totality of circumstances" bearing upon the prob- 
able intent of the parties. Under this freewheeling inquiry, 
evidence as to the amount of consideration paid for the mineral 
rights acquired, including the express development easement, in 
relation to the actual value of the land; and, the physical
character of the land, i.e., whether the property was then im-
99
proved agriculturally or unimproved mountainous land.
- 15-
As to the minority view, a California intermediate appell-
ate court decision rendered over thirty years ago, Trklja v. 
Keys, is the only case found unequivocally holding that a 
mineral grant or reservation, by necessary implication, inclu-
des the right to destroy the surface in extracting the mineral. 
The court specifically limited that right to instances in which 
the substance cannot be mined by other less destructive methods. 
However, the argument that the mining process contemplated by 
the mining operatior, a dredge or dragline method, could only 
be utilized it is was "not inconsistent” with the use of the 
property being made by the surface owner was rejected.102 The 
court's reasoning, obviously rejected by. the adherents to the 
majority view, is that if the only method available to remove 
the mineral is prohibited due to the surface disturbance in-
volved, then the mineral owners' grant has been rendered "void”
103
as the enjoyment of the acquired interest has been denied. 
Although the court's opinion did not so indicate, implicit in 
its reasoning is an assumption that under such circumstances, 
the parties to the conveyance, more probable than not, contem-
plated that the mineral could be extracted despite the radical 
consequences resulting to the surface estate.
However, existing case law, even though there is no case 
in point, in an influential natural resources producing state, 
Texas, portends that a strong minority may exist. Decisions 
in that state intimate that the severed mineral owner, by vir-
tue of the breadth of the implied easement of reasonable ne-
cessary surface usage, may be entitled under some circumstances 
to extract the mineral by surface mining.
One such case is Sun Oil Co. v. Whittaker. 104 There, the 
defendant, by conveyance in which the grantor retained the min- 
eral interest, acquired the surface estate "subject to" the 
plaintiff’s outstanding oil and gas lease. The lease contain-
ed a "free water" clause which provided: "Lessee shall have 
free use of oil, gas, coal, wood and water from said land ex-
cept from lessor's wells for all operations hereunder...
The Ogallala acquifer, a closed and isolated underground fresh 
water reservoir, underlay the tract and was its only source of 
water for domestic or irrigation purposes. Such underground 
water, not having been severed from the fee estate by a 
previous reservation or conveyance, is a part of the surface 
estate106 and was therefore owned by the surface owner. The 
defendant, a farmer, drilled wells and produced water from the 
Ogallala Reservoir for domestic use and agricultural irrigation.
The plaintiff secured oil production, from the San Andres 
formation, on the tract. Thereafter, within the secondary term 
of the lease production declined due to dimunition of the under-
ground pressure in the reservoir. Five years after the defen-
dant had commenced using the underground water, plaintiff ini-
tiated a secondary recovery "waterflooding" project to stimu-
late oil production. The project, a reservoir repressuring 
operation, involved the injection of an enormous amount of water 
into the San Andres formation. After a futile attempt to use 
salt water, the plaintiff drilled a water well on the tract 
and began taking 100,000 gallons of water per day from the 
Ogallala Reservoir. As that rate of consumption for the dura-
- 17-
tion of the project would diminish the life of the defendant's 
dwindling water supply by eight years, the value of the surface 
estate would be substantialy decreased. The waterflood opera-
tion, however, would result in additional oil production valued 
at over $3.2 million dollars. Sufficient water for the pro-
ject was available and could have been purchased from the owners 
of the other tracts in the area for $42,000.
The plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the defendant from 
interfering with its production of water for use in the second-
ary recovery project. The defendant crossclaimed to enjoin the 
plaintiff from producing and using such water, and, addition-
ally, sought actual and exemplary damages for the water so ap-
propriated. In the trial court, the defendant prevailed and was 
awarded actual and exemplary damages and the plaintiff was 
enjoined from producing and using the water in its waterflood 
program.
108
On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals perceived that 
the plaintiff's right to free use of the defendant's water in 
a secondary recovery project was solely governed by the appli-
cability of the free water clause. Finding that clause ambi-
guous as to whether the parties thereby intended to permit the 
lessee to make, such extensive use of the water, it affirmed the 
trial court's judgment on the basis that extrinsic evidence, ad-
mitted below, was sufficient to support the lower court's deter-
mination that such extensive use was not contemplated by the 
parties.
In an opinion stressing the dominance of the mineral
109
estate, the Supreme Court, with four judges dissenting, re-
versed the judgments of the lower courts and held that as the 
waterflood operation was reasonably necessary to the production 
of oil, the plaintiff, as the owner of the dominant mineral 
estate, was entitled to the free use of the water as an inci- 
dent of the implied development easement, i.e., "the free use 
of such part and so much of the premises as is reasonably ne-
cessary to effectuate the purposes of the lease, having due re- 
gards to the rights of the surface owner."110
The concept of accomodation between the mineral estate and 
the surface estate inherent in the "reasonable necessity” and
"due regards" standard of the implied development easement had
111
previously been delineated in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones which
h eld that the lessee must utilize a reasonable alternative method,
if available, when its contemplated use substantially interfered
with or precluded an existing use made by the surface owner. As
water was available for purchase from other tracts in the area,
it would seem that the "reasonable alternatives" test of Getty
would preclude the lessee’s free use of the water. However, the
court limited Getty by holding that test only applicable when
the reasonable alternative is located on the premises. According
to the court, to force the plaintiff to purchase the necessary
water from other sources would be in "derogation" of its domi-
112
nant mineral estate.
Also, the lower court’s determination that the free water 
clause did not sanction such use of the water, based on the as- 
certained intent of the parties to the instrument of severance 
derived from the extrinsic evidence, was rendered irrelevant by
- 19-
court held, affirming the judgment of the trial court, which 
denied recovery to the plaintiff, that as the mining operator, 
owner of the dominant estate, could only mine the sulphur by a 
process which caused subsidence, the "reasonably necessary” 
requirement of the implied development easement was satisfied 
and the servient surface estate's right to subjacent support 
was precluded by the applicability of the mining grant.17
As the mining practices in Whittaker resulted in the
dimunition of the surface owner's water supply and, consequently,
the market value of the surface estate, it essentially holds
that the dominant mineral estate, in the proper exercise of the
implied development easement, is entitled by law, without lia-
118
bility for damages, to destroy the surface estate.18 The same
observation can be made of Texas Gulf Sulphur. The inferences
to be derived from both cases is that the severed surface estate
may be surfaced mined by the mining operator to recover a coal
deposit that can only be physically extracted, or perhaps, com-
119
mercially mined by surface mining. As subsidence can result 
in the complete destruction, eliminating any beneficial use of 
the surface, and is the recognized theoretical foundation for 
the holding that the surface estate is entitled to surface pre- 
servation, free from the interference and harm of surface min-
ing, Texas Gulf Sulphur, indoubtably supports that inference.
However, the implication of the right to surface mine in 
a deed of severance, as well as any such previously imparted 
express rights, may be rendered insignificant by a legislative 
act which insulates the surface owner from uninvited surface
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mining,120 "surface owner consent" statutes require the mine
operator to obtain the acquiesence of the surface owner to the
surface mining of the tract independent of any such previously
121
acquired right. In effect, the surface owner is vested with
a statutory right to "veto" the mining of the tract and preclude
122
its inclusion within the mining unit.122 Obviously, if such
consent is granted by the surface owner, it won't be gratuitious 
Of dubious constitutional validity, such acts are indicative 
that state legislation may be invoked to protect landowners124 
from the burdens of surface mining and that such attempts may 
not necessarily be structured to encourage the orderly develop- 
ment of coal reserves.
Acquiring Surface Mineable Coal Reserves
The nature of the property interests that the mining oper-
ator will have to acquire as a prerequisite to the surface 
mining of a tract is determined by the particular jurisdiction's 
treatment of the implied right to surface mine. In a state in 
which such a right is not recognized, the severance of the coal 
interest from the surface interest necessitates that the mining 
operator obtain a mining lease from the mineral owner, granting 
the right to mine for coal, and, in addition, the consent of the 
surface owner to the surface mining of the tract.12 5 If there 
has been no severance of the coal from the surface estate, a
coal lease, containing an express right to surface mine, from
126
the landowner, will suffice. However, in a jurisdiction
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which recognizes the implied right to surface mine as an inci- 
dent to the implied development easement, a mining lease from the 
owner of the coal interest will suffice even if that interest 
has previously been severed from the surface estate. The consent 
to surface mine need only be acquired from the owner of the 
severed surface estate in the event that the instrument of sev- 
erance specifically precluded such surface destruction or rea- 
sonable alternatives to the extraction of the minerals by sur-
face mining exist.
The actual practices of acquiring coal reserves reflect
the complications implicit in obtaining mining rights that
substantially impact on the land and in which, depending upon
the jurisdiction, the respective rights of the severed mineral
and surface estates as to the coal or the right to surface mine
may not yet have been delineated. In some jurisdictions, the
title to the coal is clouded due to the existence of a grant
or reservation in which the coal is not specifically identified
128
but the expansive term "mineral" is utilized. In such a
grant or reservation, the coal may or may not have been severed from 
or retained by the surface estate. Endemnic to oil and gas 
conveyances, such language is characteristic of mineral trans- 
actions occurring in areas experiencing oil and gas exploration 
activities. The applicability of the implied right to surface 
mine, as a matter of law, also may not have been judicially as-
certained. Furthermore, the possibility exists that the sur-
face owner, bearing the burden of surface mining, may have an 
interest that amounts to a "veto" over the surface mining of the
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tract, and does have some ill-defined right to participate in 
the formulation of the reclamation129 plan, and yet, is not 
entitled to the economic benefits, the royalties and advance 
royalties, traditionally associated with mineral development.
As a result, it is not uncommon for the mining operator 
contemplating surface mining to purchase the land outright,130 
i.e., to obtain both the surface and mineral fee estates, even 
though acquiring the mining rights by leasing requires "less up 
front" money. Acquiring a mining lease from both the mineral 
and surface estate owners and, in effect, paying double royal- 
ties and advance royalties is also a prevalent practice.
Leasing the surface owner, as well as the mineral owner, procures 
the prerequisite consent when the holder of the coal title lacks 
an express or implied right to surface mine, and, additionally, 
also secures the necessary mining rights by binding all possi- 
ble claimants, i.e., the surface and mineral owners, to the dis-
puted coal title created by an instrument of severance which 
contains the inclusive but undefined term "minerals," or other 
kindred language within the grant. Additionally, in the western 
states where the doctrine of prior appropriation may result in 
an adjacent tract owner having title to appurtenant surface waters, 
it is not uncommon for a mining operator to acquire the water 
rights by a mining lease which grants that party the right to 
receive royalties and advance royalties in order to lessen the
potential impact of third party water rights on the surface
133
mining project.
Acquisition of the fee ownership of the land outright, in
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particular as to the surface estate, is advantageous to the 
mining operator in that it eliminates the potential disputes 
that may arise over the landowner's status during the mining 
process or the formulation, implementation or eventual outcome 
of reclamation.134 Leasing the surface owner not only obtains 
the requisite express right to surface mine or ensures title 
to coal that ultimately may be determined not to have been 
severed from the surface estate by the term "minerals", or other 
similar equivocal language in the grant; but, additionally, 
the obligation to pay "surface royalties" vests an economic 
interest in the surface mining of the tract in the likely prin-
cipal antagonist to the mining venture, the surface owner, and 
thereby lessens the opportunity for differences to arise between 
the mining operator and the landowner over the mining and rec-
lamation process.
Despite the possibility that the mining operator may offer 
to purchase the land outright or to pay surface royalties, the 
acquisition of the surface mineable coal reserves, even at a high 
price, will be difficult. For a multiplicity of reasons, not 
the least of which is that it may require foregoing a present 
livelihood such as farming, or ranching, selling the land or 
surface estate outright, either as an incident of or independent 
of the sale of the coal, may not be acceptable to the respec-
tive landowner regardless of the financial inducement. Further-
more, the potential for fragmented ownership of the necessary 
mining rights in some jurisdictions, i.e., requiring successful 
negotiations with both surface and mineral owners; and, the
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attendant disruption to the surface state, including the possi-
ble dislocation of the surface owner, along with the justifiable 
apprehension as to the utility and value of the land after rec-
lamation, forewarns that attempts to acquire the necessary min-
ing rights by mining lease, even if munificent surface and min-
eral royalties and bonuses are paid, will often fail.
The Problem of Hold Out Acreage
Not only does the hold out acreage phenomena have the 
potential to preclude the aggregation of sufficient coal re-
serves necessary to establish a mining unit that conforms to 
the market for coal conversion or that renders the project 
economically feasible, but, the impact to the hold out acreage 
from surface mining in the unit may preclude compliance with 
the reclamation act as to the committed acreage and, thus, also 
condemn the mining project. In effect, the environmental 
characteristics of the specific mine site such as the topo- 
graphy, dimension and chemical composition of the coal seam and 
overburden, and the nature of the hydrological system may in-
herently portend that the unavoidable impact of surface mining 
to the hold out acreage is so adverse as to preclude compli-
ance with the requisite minimum environmental performance stand-
ards that accord protection to off-site areas.
The most omnious example of holdout acreage frustrating 
the acquisition of the surface mining permit for committed 
acreage is the "toadstool" phenomena.135 When coal deposits
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chat are characterized by either a massive coal seam or an over-
burden that is slight in relation to the thickness of the coal 
seam are surfaced mined from tracts that are adjacent to or sur-
round non-committed acreage, the non-mined lands, reposing at 
their original elevation, will protrude above the recessed 
mined and reclaimed lands, creating a terrain that resembles 
a field of "toadstools.
The extended elevation in relationship to the adjacent
area will likely affect the utility of the non-mined lands in
that, for example, irrigation by surface or ground waters will 
137
be precluded. The prospect of such a distorted terrain and 
the consequent detriment to the off-site tracts will likely 
result in a denial of the surface mining permit for the committed 
acreage due to: the impact to the hydrological system of the 
non-mined lands violating the SMCRA's minimum off-site water pro-
tection standards, i.e., by inevitably causing "material damage
138
to the hydrological balance outside the permit area"138 inher-
139
ently disrupting the local physical environment; or, the 
failure to formulate a satisfactory post mining land use plan 
for such an area.140
Even if the consequences of surface mining to off-site 
areas will not be as pronounced as the anticipated detrimental 
effect of the toad stool phenomena, the specific characteristics 
of the mine site can preindicate that compliance with the off-
site environmental performance standards, in particular of the 
surface and ground water protection requirements, will be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to satisfy when hold out acreage, in
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particular of tracts located wholly within the unit, is encoun- 
tered. Thus, the protection accorded to off-site areas by the 
applicable reclamation act may prevent the mining operator from 
merely ignoring the existence of the non-committed tracts and 
proceeding with the mining of the committed acreage.
However, should the reclamation act be satisfied as to 
offsite area protection, surface mining would still impact ad-
versely on the hold out acreage. The noise and dust associated 
with the blasting and removing of the overburden by the huge 
earth moving equipment, along with the clogging of the access 
roads by trucks and other vehicles, may render occupation or 
utilization of tracts immediately adjacent to or surrounded by 
the mine site extremely impractical. 14In effect, withholding 
land from the contemplated mining unit to avoid the interference 
with the surface usage occasioned by surface mining may to a 
large extent be ah illusory act of self preservation.
Isolating the mine site from adjacent landowners to facili-
tate compliance with the applicable offsite reclamation protection 
standards and to mitigate the impact of surface mining to such 
tracts can, however, be accomplished by acquiring tracts adjacent
to and surrounding the mining unit, not for mining purposes, but
142
to act solely as a protective "barrier" to such off-site areas. 
Limiting the exposure for liability to adjacent landowners for 
nuisance, failure to provide lateral support, or for damages 
resulting from a failure to comply with the reclamation act is 
a further inducement for the mining operator to establish such 
a barrier.
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Nevertheless, interspersing tracts between the minesite 
and privately owned lands to prevent the non-commit ted acreage 
from frustrating compliance with the requisite off-site perfor-
mance standards of the reclamation act may not be a feasible or 
optimum solution for the mine operator. The inability to ac-
quire such strategically located lands or the incidence of 
the occurrence of the holdout acreage may render the utilization 
of such a plan impractical or impossible. More importantly, if 
commercially mineable coal underlies the tracts adjacent to such 
holdout acreage, utilizing such tracts to barricade the minesite 
may only further exclude reserves that are necessary or convenient 
to the establishment and operation of the mining unit.
Timely development of a much demanded energy resource is 
not the only loss occasioned by permitting holdout acreage to 
block the opening of a logical mining unit: the owners of the 
mining rights to the reserves underlying the other tracts in the 
unit, including prospective mine operators who have acquired 
coal leases or other mining rights, will be deprived of the 
benefits, such as the royalties, surface royalties, or other 
profits or advantages to be deprived from the mining of the coal. 
Since the deposit underlying the various tracts can only be 
developed as a unit, the holder of any of the necessary mining 
rights can veto the surface mining of its particular tract and, 
thus, deny to the remaining owners of the mining rights in the 
deposit the beneficial enjoyment of their property interest, 
i.e., the right to exploit their mineral interest.
Furthermore, even if the holdout acreage does not effec-
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tively forclose the opening of the mine, its omission from the
mining project may forever doom the mining and utilization of
the underlying coal reserves in that economies of scale may
render the remaining scattered non-mined tracts uneconomical to
surface mine.144 Assuming that a market, conceivably a spot
market, will exist for that amount of coal excluded from the
original mining unit; it may not be economically feasible to
acquire a surface mining permit, move on a dragline or other
equipment necessary to surface mine and reclaim, to recover
the amount of reserves underlying such isolated tracts. The
failure to achieve the "maximum optimum recovery" of the coal
reserves may result. In effect, physical waste of a valuable
and needed non-renewable natural resource, which is inimical to
the theory and practice of sound natural resources development
145
and conservation.145 is apt to be the distinguishing trait of the 
large scale development of coal reserves under circumstances in 
which the landowner may withhold his acreage from the mining 
project.
The Legislative Solution
The solution to the problem is state legislation which em-
powers the mine operator with the right to acquire, for a fair 
compensation, the necessary mining rights to the hold out acre-
age. Based on the need to facilitate development, prevent waste 
and protect the correlative rights of the owners of a valuable 
and demanded natural resource, such a statute would be a v alid
- 30-
exercise of the state police p o w e r . 146 Similar reasons justi-
147
fied and sustained the validity of state compulsory pooling 
and unitization statutes,148 which, in effect, mandated compul-
sory integration of oil and gas interests and as to the former
149
statute, may require a forced sale of the mineral interest.
Even though such a statute could simply bestow upon the mine 
operator a broad and unqualified private right of condemnation, 
along with a formula of fair compensation for the condemned 
interests; the structure of the typical oil and gas compulsory 
unitization statute is easily adaptable to the hold out acreage 
phenomena and can be modified to insure that property interests 
will only be condemned pursuant to the objectives of accelerated 
and prudent natural resources development.
Thus, the statute would vest the appropriate state conser-
vation agency with jurisdiction to delineate and establish a 
surface coal mine unit when necessary "to promote optimum 
development of coal reserves, prevent waste, and protect cor-
relative rights." The mine operator would have to demonstrate, 
and the agency so find, that is it "uneconomic or impractical" 
to mine the hold out acreage as individual tracts, or in the al-
ternative, to mine the committed acreage without the hold out 
acreage, The agency would further have to determine that, pur-
suant to the proposed mine plan, the coal reserves in the unit
152
can be developed in an "efficient, economic and orderly method." 
Should the jurisdictional requirements be satisfied after proper 
notice and hearing on the merits, the statute would require the 
agency to order the consolidation of the tracts within the unit
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area into an integrated mining unit and effectuate a transfer
of the mining rights to the non-committed acreage to the mine 
153
operator.
To permit a proposed determination of unit boundaries, 
the statute should provide the mine operator with the right to 
acquire, for a fair compensation, access to conduct coal ex-
ploratory activities, such as core drilling, on lands that may 
be included within the mine unit. Such exploratory activities 
should be limited to ascertaining the extent and characteristics 
of the underlying coal deposit. The information acquired would 
be transmitted to the affected property owners. Adequate safe- 
guards would be delineated to ensure that the interference with 
the surface estate activities would be limited.
Also, as opposed to merely being applicable to coal mineral 
and surface owner interests, the act should operate to mandate 
compulsory inclusion of coal leasehold interests into the unit. 
Hold out acreage can result from an intractable coal lessee's 
refusal to pool or otherwise commit it's acreage to the unit.
If accelerated and enlightened development of coal reserves 
demand forced acquisition of mineral and surface owner interests, 
a similarly situated coal lessee should be subject to the same 
hazards,
Furthermore, the agency, upon a petition of the owner of the 
coal interest to a tract situated adjacent to the proposed or 
established unit area, should also be empowered to compell the 
inclusion of the tract into the unit, despite the mine operator's 
objection. Thus, coal less economically attractive to the mine
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operator may be developed to the benefit of the mineral owner 
and the public. The impossibility of the mine operator's 
marketing such coal would preclude such agency action.
Of obvious importance and inherently susceptible to contro-
versy, is the compensation to be paid to the owners of the
effected property interest. As to the surface owner, some gui-
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dance exists in that the Opencast Coal Act of 1958, a stat-
utory scheme regulating surface mining of coal in Great Britain, 
specified the compensation to be paid to owners of the surface 
estate subjected to surface mining. Also, throughout the period 
in which Congress was attempting to enact surface mining legis-
lation, culminating in the SMCRA of 1977, various proposals to 
regulate surface mining on western coal lands in which the coal 
is federally owned and the surface estate is privately owned 
were advanced. 1 5 5 Some of these proposals attempted to establish 
a system of compensation for the surface owner consenting to 
surface mining.
These statutes are typically characterized by the failure 
to provide for the condemnation of the full fee interest and 
the extent of the compensation to be accorded to the surface 
o w n e r . 156Loss of the beneficial enjoyment of the surface 
estate was only to occur during the period in which the surface 
estate was actually disturbed and the surface owner was to be 
recompensed for damaged proximately caused by the surface min-
ing and the consequent interruption to the surface estate.
Such compensation encompassed damages for the annual rental value 
of the land, loss of income, cost of relocating, loss incurred
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from the forced sale of machinery and livestock, and any 
dimunition of value to the land.157 Additionally, even 
though not incorporated into any of the above statutory 
schemes, surface owner royalties, especially if widely 
utilized in the field, can also be included within the 
compensation formula.
Compensation for the acquired coal interest can take
the form of a royalty interest, likely to be based on the
prevailing royalty paid in the field, along with a bonus,
the fair market value of the development right; or, its
proportionate share of the producation, minus its propro-
tionate share of the costs of development.158 The latter
is identical to the common law treatment of a non-consenting
159
cotenant when a concurrent owner develops the mining 
property which, with some deviation, is the treatment 
typically accorded the non-assenting oil and gas mineral 
owner under forced pooling statutes.160 However, the 
problems that may be encountered in allocating the costs 
incurred in the formation and operation of a long lived 
large scale surface mine project to specific tracts, which 
will be mined at different times, may render the application 
of a net production formula impractical. Furthermore, a 
proportionate net production formula of compensation may 
not provide a  sufficient economic attractive inducement to 
the mine operator to develop holdout acreage.161
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CONCLUSION
Although condemnation of property interests, in par-
ticular of the surface estate, is not a remedy to be un- 
reluctantly adopted, the public interest requires that 
holdout acreage not impede the expeditious and enlightened 
development of surface mineable coal reserves.
Legislation can remedy the problem. The proposed 
statutory framework and potential compensation formulas 
are not offered as the definitive solution but merely to 
serve as the departure point for the diligent and meticu-
lous consideration required to perfect a fair and feasible 
legislative solution. Any such legislative solution to the 
problem must balance the public's demand for energy resources 
with the fair treatment due the property owner by establishing 
that a degree of necessity must exist before the mine operator 
may compulsorily acquire the holdout interests, providing 
for payment of fair and just compensation to the property 
owners, and, ensuring that the economic and efficient develop-
ment of coal reserves results. Obtaining such legislation, 
due to the competing interests involved, will not be an 
easy task and the attention and expertise of the mineral 
practitioner and the land person is required to ensure that 
the definitive statutory solution is achieved so that when 
enacted, it will be as successful as the legislation that 
pioneered state regulation of mineral resources, compul-
sory oil and gas pooling and unitization statutes.
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Stewart v. Chernicky, 439 Pa. 43, 226 A.2d 259 (1970); New
-8-
Charter Coal Go. v. McKee, 411 Pa. 307, 191 A.2d 830 
(1963); Wilkes-Barre Township School Dist. V. Corgan, 403 
Pa. 383, 170 A. 2d 97 (1961).; Commonwealth v. Fitz Martin, 
376 Pa. 390, 102 A.2d 893 (1954); Roches v. Duricka 374 
Pa. 262, 97 A.2d 825 (1953); Commonwealth v. Fisher, 364 
Pa. 422, 72 A.2d 568 (1950); Brown v. Crozier Coal & Land 
Co., 144 W. Va. 296, 107 S.E.2d 777 (1959); Oresta v.
Romano Bros., 137 W. Va. 633, 73 S.E.2d 622 (1952); West 
Virginia_Pittsburg Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832,
42 S.E. 2d 46 (1947); Phipps v. Leftwich, 216 Va. 706,
222 S.E.2d 536 (1976).
82. Moss v. Jourdan, 92 S. 689 (1922). This anamolous situa-
tion is not unique to surface mining: the mineral owner 
may be required "to leave every point of coal untouched 
under the land," if necessary to support the surface.
Noonan v. Pardee, 200 Pa. 474, 50 A. 2d. 255. (1901) .
83. Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2nd 244, 313 
Ne. 2d 374, 377 N. 1 (1974). See also, Barker v. Mintz,
73 Colo 411, 262 P. 534, 535 (1922); and, Ferguson, Sev-
ered Surface and Mineral Estates - Right to Use, Damage
■■ or Destroy the Surface to Recover the Mineral, 19 Rocky 
Mt. Min. L. Inst. 411, 418 (1974).
84. 151 Eng. Rep. 27 (Ex. 1839).
85. 116 Eng. Rep 1048 (Q.B. 1850).
86. Benton v. U.S. Manganese Corp., 229 Ark. 181, 313 S.W.2d 
839 (1958); Barker v. Mintz, 73 Colo 411, 262 P. 534 (1923); 
Skivolocki v. East Ohio Gas Co., 38 Ohio St. 2d 244, 313 
N.E.2d 374 (1974); Franklin v. Callicoat, 53 Ohio Ap. 240, 
110 N.E.688 (1954); Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 376 Pa.
390, 102 A.2d 893 (1954); Brown v. Crozier Coal & Land Co. 
144 W. Va. 296, 107 S.E.2d 777 (1959); Oresta v. Romano 
Bros., 137 W. Va. 633, 73 S.E.2d 622 (1952); W. Va. Pitts-
burgh Coal v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 42 S.E.2d 46 (1949).
87. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 129 W. Va. 832, 
42 S.E.2d 46, 51 (1947).
88. In Harris v. Ryding, supra note, at 31, Baron Parke in his 
concurring opinion observed:
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the coal and let down the surface, or injure the en-
joyment of it; it is very like the case of the grant of 
an upper room in the house, with the reservation by
- 9-
the grantor of a lower room, he undertaking not to 
do anything which will derogate from the right to 
occupy the upper room; and if he were to remove the 
supports of the upper room, he would be liable in an 
action of covenant; for the grantor is not entitled 
to defeat his own act by taking away the underpinnings 
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quently mined a shallow feldspar deposit by open pit 
mining. The plaintiff, basing his action on the failure
of the defendant to provide subjacent support, sued to re-
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105. 483 S.W.2d at 810.
106. Fleming Foundation v. Texaco, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 
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8 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 255 (1974); Patterson, Survey of 
Problems Associated with Ascertaining the Ownership of 
"Other Minerals", 25 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Rev. 21-1 (1979).
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see, Kalter and Tyner, supra note 25at 86, et seq.
145. Prevention of physical waste of a valuable natural resource 
and the protection of correlative rights is the basis of 
typical state regulation of oil and gas. See, 5 Kuntz,
Law of Oil and Gas, §70.1 (1978).
146. Eminent domain, traditionally, may only be exercised by 
the sovereign for the "public use." However, statutory 
doncemnation schemes which require the acquired interest 
to be utilized by private parties have been constitution-
ally sustained. See, for example, a Mill Act case, Head 
v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 5 S. Ct. 441, 28 L .Ed.
441 (1885)7 discussed in Williams, supra note at 
Also, see, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 79 S. Ct. 98,
99 L. Ed.2d 27 (1954) in which the Court sustained the 
constitutional validity of the taking of the plaintiff's 
property, which was not in a delapidated condition, to
be subsequently redeveloped, by private parties, on the 
basis of the sovereign's interest in eliminating slums 
and creating aesthetically desirable neighborhoods. See 
generally Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain,
47 Wash. L. Rev. 553, 588-597 (1972); Comment, The Public 
Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An advance Requiem 58 
Yale L. J. 599 (1949).
-33. See, 120 Cong. Rec. 25230 (1974) (Remarks of Rep. Ruppe).
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Some state constitutions specifically define the public 
use to include mining purposes. See, Art. I, §14 Idaho 
Const., Art III, §15 Mont. Const. Conceivably, the re-
strictive interpretation of the public use requirement 
contained in a state constitution or enabling statute 
could render a state statute providing for condemnation 
for mining purposes unconstitutional. See, generally, 
Campbell, Condemnation of Mining Properties, 14 Rocky 
Mt. Min. L. Inst. 231 (1968).
147. Hunter v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So.2d 495 (1942), ap-
peal dis'md 320 U.S. 222, 64 S. Ct. 19, 88 L. Ed. 5 
(1943); Patterson v. Standolind Oil & Gas Co., 182 Okla. 
155, 77 P.2d 83 (1938) appeal dism’d 305 U.S. 376, 59 S. 
Ct. 259, 85 L.E. 231 (1939).
148. Armstrong v. High Crest Oils, Inc., 164 Mont. 187, 520 
P.2d 1081 (1974); Palmer Oil Corn. v. Amerada Pet. Corp., 
204 Okl. 543, 231 P.2d 997 (1951), appeal dism’d 343,
U.S. 390, 72 S. Ct. 842, 96 L.Ed. 1022 (1952).
149. 6 Williams & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, §§906.2-3 (1977).
150. See, generally, Williams, Unitization of Mining Proper-
ties, 17 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 245 (1972) which dis-
cusses, inter alia, the only found compulsory unitization 
statute applicable to hard mineral, "Consolidation of 
Small Tracts for Mineral Development", 69 N.M. Stat. Ann. 
§9-1 et seq. (1967), which is applicable only to small 
tracts of uranium.
151. Basically, the mine unit contemplated by the statute is 
analogous to the logical mining unit, which may be estab-
lished, as provided by the Mineral Leasing Act Amendment 
of 1975, 30 U.S.C.A. 202(A), upon approval by the 
Secretary of the Interior, by consolidation of federal 
coal leases, in excess of the statutory maximum of the 
size of an area that may be leased, to achieve economic 
and efficient recovery of coal reserves. The amendment 
provides as follows:
The Secretary, upon determining the maximum economic 
recovery of the coal deposit or deposits is served 
thereby, may approve the consolidation of coal 
leases into a logical mining unit. Such consolida-
tion may only take place after a public hearing, if 
requested by an person whose interest is or may be 
adversely affected. A logical mining unit is an area 
of land in which the coal resources can be developed 
in an efficient, economical, and orderly manner as a 
unit with due regard to conservation of coal reserves 
and other resources. A logical mining unit may con-
sist of one or more Federal leaseholds, and may in-
clude intervening or adjacent lands in which the
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United States does not own the coal resources, but 
all the lands in a logical mining unit must be under 
the effective control of a single operator, be able 
to be developed and operated as a single operation 
and be contiguous.
For a discussion of the logical mining unit and economies 
of scale in coal surface minings, see, Kalter & Tyner, 
supra note 25 at 36.
152. Additionally, the statute could also require the mine 
operator to hold the respective necessary mining rights 
equal in the aggregate to a stated percentage, computed 
on an acreage basis, to the total interests contained in 
the unit. The New Mexico Compulsory Unitization statute 
infra, note 150 at §9 contained such a requirement. How-
ever, due to the inevitable resistance to surface mining, 
such a statutory requirement, especially if it equaled the 
percentage of the consenting owners commonly required in 
compulsory unitization schemes, ranging, from 62.5% in 
Alaska to 857% in Mississippi, Williams 6c Meyers, supra 
note 149 at §913.5, could render the statute inoperable.
153. To initiate the regulatory process, the petition of the 
applicant would have to include, inter alia, a detailed 
description of the following: the boundaries of the 
proposed unit; the unit mining and reclamation plans; 
the projected mining and reclamation schedule for each 
respective tract; the extent and characteristics of the 
coal deposit underlying the proposed unit and each res-
pective tract; and, the relevant ownership information 
as to the committed and non-committed acreage. Also, 
the facts necessary to determine the amount of compensa-
tion due to each affected property owner under the requi-
site formula would have to be specified.
154. Law of Aug. 1, 1958, The Opencast Coal Act, 22 Halsbury’s 
Laws of England, §1, et seq., at 4720, (3d Ed. 1970).
155. For a legislative history discussing the primary legis-
lative amendments offered as a solution to the regulation 
of surface mining of federal coal on privately owned sur-
face estates, see, Dunlap, supra note 27 at 28 to 31; 
Gallinger & Haughey, Legislation Protection of the Sur-
face Owner in the Surface Mining of Coal Reserved by the 
United States, 22 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 145, 154-164 
(1976); Comment, Surface Mining of the Severed Estate, 
supra note 23 at 146-153.
156. Even if the instrument of severance grants the express 
right to surface mine, Arkansas has held that the surface 
owner is still entitled to be compensated for the destruc-
tion of the surface estate. Benton v. U.S. Manganese 
Corp., 229 Ark. 181, 313 S.W.2d 839 (1958). Kentucky
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courts have held to the contrary. Martin v. Kentucky Oak 
Mining Co., 427 S.W.2d 395 (Ky. 1968); Buchanan v. Watson, 
290 STW.2d 40 (Ky. 1956). See, for a discussion of the 
cases, Norvell, The Coal and Lignite Lease Compared to the 
Oil and Gas Lease, 31 Ark. L. Rev. 420, 446 (1977). 
Therefore, in Arkansas, even if the right to surface mine 
has been acquired in a prior grant or reservation, the 
surface owner may still have to be compensated.
As Whittaker and Texas Gulf Sulphur indicate, if the right 
to surface mine exists as an incident of the ownership 
of the dominant mineral estate, by virtue of the implied 
development easement, compensation of the surface owner 
would not be required.
157. See, 22 Halsbury's Laws, §§17-36, at 494-515; and, also, 
H.R. 25, quoted at 120 Cong. Rec. 7064.
158. Advance royalties , from the date of the condemnation until 
the actual mining of the tract, may also be utilized in the 
compensation formula, especially if such royalties are 
prevalent in the field.
159. Prarie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1924); 
Earp v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 167 Okl. 86, 27
P .2d 855 (1933); Burnham v. Hardy Oil Co., 147 S.W. 330,
108 Tex. 555, 195 S.W. 1139 (1917).
160. Some forced pooling statutes, in fact, treat the affect-
ed mineral owner more generously than the common law 
treatment accorded to the non-consenting cotenant, by 
providing that the operator can only recoup his expenses 
out of seven-eights of the proceeds due such mineral own-
er which ensures a one-eight royalty regardless of whether 
the operator's costs are ever recovered. See, 53 Ark.
Stat. §115 (1941); 52 Okla. Stat. Ann. §87-l(d)(1971).
161. New Mexico's hard mineral compulsory statute provides for 
compensating the mineral owner by a royalty interest, 69 
N.M. Stat. Ann. 9-8(1967).
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